594 lines
47 KiB
Plaintext
594 lines
47 KiB
Plaintext
chapter {* Analysing NSL *}
|
|
(* ***********************************
|
|
This file is automatically generated from the AnB file "AnB/nsl.AnB".
|
|
Backend: Open Source Fixedpoint Model Checker version 2009c
|
|
************************************ *)
|
|
|
|
theory
|
|
"nsl"
|
|
imports
|
|
"../src/ofmc"
|
|
begin
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
section {* Protocol Model (NSL) *}
|
|
datatype Role = rA | rB
|
|
|
|
datatype Purpose = purposeNI | purposeNA | purposeNB
|
|
datatype Agent = honest nat
|
|
| dishonest nat
|
|
|
|
datatype Nonce = "ni" "nat"
|
|
| "absNA" "Msg" "nat"
|
|
| "absNB" "Msg" "nat"
|
|
| "NI"
|
|
| "NA"
|
|
| "NB"
|
|
and Msg = Nonce "Nonce"
|
|
| Agent "Agent"
|
|
| Purpose "Purpose"
|
|
| pair "Msg*Msg"
|
|
| scrypt "Msg*Msg"
|
|
| crypt "Msg*Msg"
|
|
| inv "Msg"
|
|
| SID "nat"
|
|
| Step "nat"
|
|
| authentication
|
|
| secrecy
|
|
(* SymKeys *)
|
|
| SymKey "Msg"
|
|
(* Functions *)
|
|
| "pk" "Msg"
|
|
|
|
datatype Fact = Iknows Msg
|
|
| State "Role * (Msg list)"
|
|
| Secret "Msg * Msg"
|
|
| Attack "Msg"
|
|
| Witness "Msg * Msg * Msg * Msg"
|
|
| Request "Msg * Msg * Msg * Msg * Msg"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
section {* Inductive Protocol Definition (NSL) *}
|
|
inductive_set
|
|
NSL::"Fact list set"
|
|
where
|
|
init_0: "[ Iknows(Nonce((ni Abs_NI)))] : NSL"
|
|
| init_1: "[ Iknows(Agent(dishonest(i)))] : NSL"
|
|
| init_2: "[ State(rA, [Agent(honest(a)), Step(0), Agent(dishonest(i)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a)))), SID(sid)] )] : NSL"
|
|
| init_3: "[ State(rA, [Agent(honest(a)), Step(0), Agent(honest(a)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a)))), SID(sid)] )] : NSL"
|
|
| init_4: "[ Iknows(Step(0))] : NSL"
|
|
| init_5: "[ Iknows(inv(pk(Agent(dishonest(i)))))] : NSL"
|
|
| init_6: "[ Iknows(SID(sid))] : NSL"
|
|
| init_7: "[ Iknows(Agent(honest(a)))] : NSL"
|
|
| init_8: "[ State(rB, [Agent(honest(a)), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a)))), SID(sid)] )] : NSL"
|
|
| rule_0: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Iknows(crypt(K, M)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(inv(K)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Iknows(M))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_1: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Iknows(crypt(inv(K), M)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(K) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Iknows(M))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_2: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Iknows(scrypt(K, M)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(K) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Iknows(M))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_3: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Iknows(pair(M1, M2)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Iknows(M1))
|
|
#(Iknows(M2))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_4: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Secret(M, Agent(honest(a))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(M) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Attack(pair(secrecy, M)))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_5: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Request(A, B, Purpose(purposeNA), M, SID(sid)) : (set t);
|
|
~ ( ? i .
|
|
B = Agent(dishonest(i)));
|
|
~ ( ? B A Abs_NA .
|
|
M = Nonce((absNA(pair(B, A)) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Attack(pair(authentication, pair(A, pair(B, M)))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_6: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
Request(A, B, Purpose(purposeNB), M, SID(sid)) : (set t);
|
|
~ ( ? i .
|
|
B = Agent(dishonest(i)));
|
|
~ ( ? B A Arg1 Abs_NB .
|
|
M = Nonce((absNB(pair(B, pair(A, Arg1))) Abs_NB)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Attack(pair(authentication, pair(A, pair(B, M)))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_7: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(0), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(B)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA))))
|
|
#(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A)))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_8: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A)))) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB))))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_9: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(B))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB))))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_10: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB))))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_11: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A)))) : (set t);
|
|
~ ( ? A B Abs_NA .
|
|
Nonce(NA) = Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB))))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_12: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(B))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : (set t);
|
|
~ ( ? A B Abs_NA .
|
|
Nonce(NA) = Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB))))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_13: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : (set t);
|
|
~ ( ? A B Abs_NA .
|
|
Nonce(NA) = Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)))
|
|
#(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB))))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_14: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B))))) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Request(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce(NB), SID(sid)))
|
|
#(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(2), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_15: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(A))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Request(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce(NB), SID(sid)))
|
|
#(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(2), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_16: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Request(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce(NB), SID(sid)))
|
|
#(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(2), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_17: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Request(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce(NA), SID(sid)))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_18: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(B))) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Request(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce(NA), SID(sid)))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
| rule_19: "[| t :NSL;
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : (set t);
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : (set t)|]
|
|
==>
|
|
((Request(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce(NA), SID(sid)))
|
|
#(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ))
|
|
#t) : NSL"
|
|
|
|
|
|
section {* Fixed-point Definition (NSL) *}
|
|
definition
|
|
"NSL_fp = {m. ( ? Abs_NA3 Abs_NA4 Abs_NA5 i9 Abs_NI1 Abs_NI2 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a17 a18 a19 Abs_NA1 Abs_NA2 a3 a4 i2 i3 a5 i4 Abs_NB2 i5 a6 i6 Abs_NB3 a7 i7 Abs_NB4 a8 a9 a10 i8 Abs_NB5 sid0 Abs_NI0 Abs_NA0 a0 i0 Abs_NB0 a1 i1 Abs_NB1 a2 .
|
|
(m = Iknows(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(Agent(dishonest(i0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(0), Agent(dishonest(i0)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(0), Agent(honest(a1)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a2)))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(Step(0)))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(inv(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(Agent(honest(a0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Secret(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(dishonest(i1))))
|
|
| (m = Witness(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), Agent(dishonest(i0)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i2))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a4)))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Secret(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(honest(a1)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a2))))
|
|
| (m = Witness(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(honest(a1)), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(honest(a3)))) Abs_NA0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), Agent(honest(a1)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a2)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(honest(a4)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(honest(a7)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a8)))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(dishonest(i1))))
|
|
| (m = Witness(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a2))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI1)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i3))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a4)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a5))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a2))))
|
|
| (m = Witness(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(honest(a1)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(honest(a2)), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a3))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI1)), Agent(honest(a4)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a7))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a8)), pair(Agent(honest(a9)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a10))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a0))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a3)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a0))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Agent(honest(a2)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a3))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a1))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1))))))
|
|
| (m = Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a2))))
|
|
| (m = Witness(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(honest(a1)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0))))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(honest(a2)), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(honest(a4)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(honest(a7)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a8)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a9)), pair(Agent(honest(a10)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a11))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a12)), Agent(honest(a13)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a14)), pair(Agent(honest(a15)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a16))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a0))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Agent(honest(a2)))) Abs_NA0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), pair(Agent(honest(a4)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a5)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1))))))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a3))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a4)), Agent(dishonest(i2)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(dishonest(i6)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i7)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a8))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(honest(a2)), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a4))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a6)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(honest(a8)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a9))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a10)), Agent(dishonest(i2)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a11)), pair(Agent(honest(a12)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a13))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a3))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a4)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB2)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i5))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i6)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB3)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i7)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB4)), Agent(honest(a8))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(honest(a2)), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a4))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a6)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(honest(a8)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB2)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a9))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a10)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB3)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a11)), pair(Agent(honest(a12)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB4)), Agent(honest(a13))))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(honest(a1)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), Agent(honest(a1)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a2)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(honest(a4)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(honest(a7)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a8)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a9)), pair(Agent(honest(a10)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a11))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a12)), Agent(honest(a13)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a14)), pair(Agent(honest(a15)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a16))))), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a17))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a18)), pair(Agent(honest(a19)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB2))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), Agent(dishonest(i0)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i2))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a4)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), Agent(dishonest(i4)))) Abs_NA2)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a6))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), Agent(dishonest(i5)))) Abs_NA3)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a8)), Agent(dishonest(i6)))) Abs_NA4)), Agent(dishonest(i7))))), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i8))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a9)), Agent(dishonest(i9)))) Abs_NA5))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), Agent(dishonest(i0)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i2))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a4)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a6))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), Agent(dishonest(i5)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a8)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i6)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(dishonest(i7))))), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i8))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a9)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i9)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB2))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rA, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), Agent(dishonest(i0)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i2))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a4)))), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(dishonest(i4)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI1)), Agent(dishonest(i5))))), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i6))), Nonce((ni Abs_NI2))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a2))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI1)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i3))), pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a4)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a5))))), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a6))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i5)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB2))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a0))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a0))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a4)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a2)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a0))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a4)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i0))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a2)))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a2))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a2))))))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(honest(a1)), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(honest(a3)))) Abs_NA0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(honest(a2)), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a3)), Agent(honest(a4)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(honest(a7)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(honest(a8)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a9)), pair(Agent(honest(a10)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a11))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a12)), Agent(honest(a13)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a14)), pair(Agent(honest(a15)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a16))))), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a17))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a18)), pair(Agent(honest(a19)), Step(1)))) Abs_NB2))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), Agent(dishonest(i1)))) Abs_NA0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a3))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a4)), Agent(dishonest(i2)))) Abs_NA1)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i5))), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), Agent(dishonest(i6)))) Abs_NA2)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i7)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a8))))), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a9))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a10)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i8)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB2))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Request(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), SID(sid0)))
|
|
| (m = State(rB, [Agent(honest(a0)), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a1)))), Agent(dishonest(i0)), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a2)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a3))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a4)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i2)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(dishonest(i3)))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a5)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i4)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB2)), crypt(pk(Agent(dishonest(i5))), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a6)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i6)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB3)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a7)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i7)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB4)), Agent(honest(a8))))), crypt(pk(Agent(honest(a9))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a10)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i8)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB5))), SID(sid0)] ))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1)))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((ni Abs_NI0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a1))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), Agent(dishonest(i0)))) Abs_NA0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), Agent(honest(a2))))))
|
|
| (m = Iknows(pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a0)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i0)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB0)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(honest(a1)), pair(Agent(dishonest(i1)), Step(0)))) Abs_NB1)), Agent(honest(a2))))))
|
|
)}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
section {* Checking Fixed-point (NSL) *}
|
|
lemma fp_attack_free: "~ (Attack m : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_0: "Iknows(Nonce((ni Abs_NI))) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_1: "Iknows(Agent(dishonest(i))) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_2: "State(rA, [Agent(honest(a)), Step(0), Agent(dishonest(i)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_3: "State(rA, [Agent(honest(a)), Step(0), Agent(honest(a)), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_4: "Iknows(Step(0)) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_5: "Iknows(inv(pk(Agent(dishonest(i))))) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_6: "Iknows(SID(sid)) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_7: "Iknows(Agent(honest(a))) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma init_8: "State(rB, [Agent(honest(a)), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(honest(a)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_0: "[|
|
|
Iknows(crypt(K, M)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(inv(K)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Iknows(M) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_1: "[|
|
|
Iknows(crypt(inv(K), M)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(K) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Iknows(M) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_2: "[|
|
|
Iknows(scrypt(K, M)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(K) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Iknows(M) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_3: "[|
|
|
Iknows(pair(M1, M2)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Iknows(M1) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(M2) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_4: "[|
|
|
Secret(M, Agent(honest(a))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(M) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Attack(pair(secrecy, M)) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_5: "[|
|
|
Request(A, B, Purpose(purposeNA), M, SID(sid)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
~ ( ? i .
|
|
B = Agent(dishonest(i)));
|
|
~ ( ? B A Abs_NA .
|
|
M = Nonce((absNA(pair(B, A)) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Attack(pair(authentication, pair(A, pair(B, M)))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_6: "[|
|
|
Request(A, B, Purpose(purposeNB), M, SID(sid)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
~ ( ? i .
|
|
B = Agent(dishonest(i)));
|
|
~ ( ? B A Arg1 Abs_NB .
|
|
M = Nonce((absNB(pair(B, pair(A, Arg1))) Abs_NB)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Attack(pair(authentication, pair(A, pair(B, M)))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_7: "[|
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(0), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(B)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A)))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_8: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A)))) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_9: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(B))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_10: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(1)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_11: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A)))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
~ ( ? A B Abs_NA .
|
|
Nonce(NA) = Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_12: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(B))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
~ ( ? A B Abs_NA .
|
|
Nonce(NA) = Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_13: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(0), inv(pk(Agent(B))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
~ ( ? A B Abs_NA .
|
|
Nonce(NA) = Nonce((absNA(pair(Agent(A), Agent(B))) Abs_NA)))|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Secret(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(A)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Witness(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB))) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce((absNB(pair(Agent(B), pair(Agent(A), Step(0)))) Abs_NB)), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_14: "[|
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B))))) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Request(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce(NB), SID(sid)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(2), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_15: "[|
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(A))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Request(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce(NB), SID(sid)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(2), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_16: "[|
|
|
State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(1), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(A)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NA)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Request(Agent(A), Agent(B), Purpose(purposeNB), Nonce(NB), SID(sid)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rA, [Agent(A), Step(2), Agent(B), inv(pk(Agent(A))), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_17: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB))) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Request(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce(NA), SID(sid)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_18: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(pk(Agent(B))) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Request(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce(NA), SID(sid)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
lemma rule_19: "[|
|
|
State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(1), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Agent(B)) : NSL_fp;
|
|
Iknows(Nonce(NB)) : NSL_fp|]
|
|
==>
|
|
(Request(Agent(B), Agent(A), Purpose(purposeNA), Nonce(NA), SID(sid)) : NSL_fp) &
|
|
(State(rB, [Agent(B), Step(2), inv(pk(Agent(B))), Agent(A), Nonce(NA), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), pair(Nonce(NA), Agent(A))), Nonce(NB), crypt(pk(Agent(A)), pair(Nonce(NA), pair(Nonce(NB), Agent(B)))), crypt(pk(Agent(B)), Nonce(NB)), SID(sid)] ) : NSL_fp)"
|
|
by(simp only: NSL_fp_def, simp only: set2pred, simp, auto?)+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
section {* Security Proof(s) (NSL) *}
|
|
lemma over_approx: "t : NSL ==> (set t) <= NSL_fp"
|
|
apply(rule NSL.induct, simp_all)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_0, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_1, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_2, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_3, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_4, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_5, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_6, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_7, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac init_8, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_0, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_1, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_2, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_3, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_4, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_5, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_6, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_7, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_8, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_9, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_10, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_11, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_12, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_13, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_14, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_15, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_16, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_17, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_18, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
apply(propagate_fp, cut_tac rule_19, (assumption | simp)+)
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end (* theory *)
|