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Achim D. Brucker 1 year ago
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  1. 38
      CITATION
  2. 6
      README.md

38
CITATION

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ To cite the use of this formal theory, please use
Formal proof development
A BibTeX entry for LaTeX users is
Article{ hess.ea:automated:2020,
abstract= {In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully
automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof
@ -29,3 +30,40 @@ Article{ hess.ea:automated:2020,
url = {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/hess.ea-automated-2020},
year = {2020},
}
An overview of the formalization is given in:
Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and
Anders Schlichtkrull. Performing Security Proofs of Stateful
Protocols. In 34th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF). IEEE, 2021.
https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-web-components-2019
A BibTeX entry for LaTeX users is
@InProceedings{ hess.ea:performing:2021,
abstract = {In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from
fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof
assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high
assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot:
due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are
likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is
non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages
from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and
assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a
more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a
mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach
that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an
LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple
user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language
embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing
results such as soundness of a typed model.},
author = {Andreas V. Hess and Sebastian M{\"o}dersheim and Achim D. Brucker and Anders Schlichtkrull},
booktitle = {34th {IEEE} Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)},
location = {June 21-25, 2021, Dubrovnik, Croatia},
pdf = {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/download/2021/hess.ea-performing-2021.pdf},
publisher = {{IEEE}},
title = {Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols},
url = {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/hess.ea-performing-2021},
year = {2021},
}

6
README.md

@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ Assurance & Security Research Team](https://logicalhacking.com) at
## Publications
* Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and Anders
Schlichtkrull. Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols. In
34th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). , IEEE,
2021.
https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-web-components-2019
* Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and Anders
Schlichtkrull. Automated Stateful Protocol Verification. In Archive
of Formal Proofs, 2020.

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