Added CSF 2021 paper.
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CITATION
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CITATION
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@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ To cite the use of this formal theory, please use
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Formal proof development
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A BibTeX entry for LaTeX users is
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Article{ hess.ea:automated:2020,
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abstract= {In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully
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automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof
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@ -29,3 +30,40 @@ Article{ hess.ea:automated:2020,
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url = {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/hess.ea-automated-2020},
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year = {2020},
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}
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An overview of the formalization is given in:
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Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and
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Anders Schlichtkrull. Performing Security Proofs of Stateful
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Protocols. In 34th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
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(CSF). IEEE, 2021.
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https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-web-components-2019
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A BibTeX entry for LaTeX users is
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@InProceedings{ hess.ea:performing:2021,
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abstract = {In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from
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fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof
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assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high
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assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot:
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due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are
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likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is
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non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages
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from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and
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assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a
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more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a
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mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach
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that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an
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LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple
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user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language
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embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing
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results such as soundness of a typed model.},
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author = {Andreas V. Hess and Sebastian M{\"o}dersheim and Achim D. Brucker and Anders Schlichtkrull},
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booktitle = {34th {IEEE} Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)},
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location = {June 21-25, 2021, Dubrovnik, Croatia},
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pdf = {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/download/2021/hess.ea-performing-2021.pdf},
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publisher = {{IEEE}},
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title = {Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols},
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url = {https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/hess.ea-performing-2021},
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year = {2021},
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}
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@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ Assurance & Security Research Team](https://logicalhacking.com) at
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## Publications
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* Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and Anders
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Schlichtkrull. Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols. In
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34th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). , IEEE,
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2021.
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https://www.brucker.ch/bibliography/abstract/brucker.ea-web-components-2019
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* Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, and Anders
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Schlichtkrull. Automated Stateful Protocol Verification. In Archive
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of Formal Proofs, 2020.
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