Automated_Stateful_Protocol.../Automated_Stateful_Protocol.../examples/Keyserver.thy

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(*
(C) Copyright Andreas Viktor Hess, DTU, 2020
(C) Copyright Sebastian A. Mödersheim, DTU, 2020
(C) Copyright Achim D. Brucker, University of Exeter, 2020
(C) Copyright Anders Schlichtkrull, DTU, 2020
All Rights Reserved.
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*)
(* Title: Keyserver.thy
Author: Andreas Viktor Hess, DTU
Author: Sebastian A. Mödersheim, DTU
Author: Achim D. Brucker, University of Exeter
Author: Anders Schlichtkrull, DTU
*)
section\<open>The Keyserver Protocol\<close>
theory Keyserver
imports "../PSPSP"
begin
declare [[code_timing]]
trac\<open>
Protocol: keyserver
Types:
honest = {a,b,c}
server = {s}
agents = honest ++ server
Sets:
ring/1 valid/2 revoked/2
Functions:
Public sign/2 crypt/2 pair/2
Private inv/1
Analysis:
sign(X,Y) -> Y
crypt(X,Y) ? inv(X) -> Y
pair(X,Y) -> X,Y
Transactions:
# Out-of-band registration
outOfBand(A:honest,S:server)
new NPK
insert NPK ring(A)
insert NPK valid(A,S)
send NPK.
# User update key
keyUpdateUser(A:honest,PK:value)
PK in ring(A)
new NPK
delete PK ring(A)
insert NPK ring(A)
send sign(inv(PK),pair(A,NPK)).
# Server update key
keyUpdateServer(A:honest,S:server,PK:value,NPK:value)
receive sign(inv(PK),pair(A,NPK))
PK in valid(A,S)
NPK notin valid(_)
NPK notin revoked(_)
delete PK valid(A,S)
insert PK revoked(A,S)
insert NPK valid(A,S)
send inv(PK).
# Attack definition
authAttack(A:honest,S:server,PK:value)
receive inv(PK)
PK in valid(A,S)
attack.
\<close>\<open>
val(ring(A)) where A:honest
sign(inv(val(0)),pair(A,val(ring(A)))) where A:honest
inv(val(revoked(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
pair(A,val(ring(A))) where A:honest
occurs(val(ring(A))) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(ring(A),valid(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
timplies(val(ring(A)),val(0)) where A:honest
timplies(val(ring(A),valid(A,S)),val(valid(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
timplies(val(0),val(valid(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
timplies(val(valid(A,S)),val(revoked(A,S))) where A:honest S:server
\<close>
subsection \<open>Proof of security\<close>
protocol_model_setup spm: keyserver
compute_SMP [optimized] keyserver_protocol keyserver_SMP
manual_protocol_security_proof ssp: keyserver
for keyserver_protocol keyserver_fixpoint keyserver_SMP
apply check_protocol_intro
subgoal by code_simp
subgoal by code_simp
subgoal by code_simp
subgoal by code_simp
subgoal by code_simp
done
end